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Introduction: Rescuing a Failed Peace  
 
It was a momentous occasion when, on November 12, 2016, after a tortuous course of 
events, Colombian president Juan Manuel Santos optimistically proclaimed the reaching of a final 
accord that would put an end to the longest military conflict in modern history. The leader of this 
violence-ridden nation sought to assuage the stalemate created by the defeat of the government’s 
position in the referendum held on October 2, that same year. The rejection of what had become 
known as the Havana Accord, signed between the Colombian government and the FARC (Fuerzas 
Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia), that same month represented an unmistakable and serious 
warning that, though essential, formal peace negotiations were not all the country needed. The 
revised agreement produced in the wake of the defeat in the referendum was later endorsed by the 
Colombian National Congress and, this time around, despite some criticism from ‘No’ supporters 
(particularly from the former president Alvaro Uribe and his conservative allies), Santos did not 
risk putting the document through a second referendum where another defeat was possible. Despite 
the feeling of achievement and the optimism conveyed by Mr. Santos, it remains to be seen how 
this revised agreement will be implemented and whether it will sufficiently redress the recent 
history of this important Latin American nation. A reflection on these important matters is the 
focus of this briefing.  
 
Colombia’s Protracted Exclusionary History  
 
To understand the recent and potentially transformative events in Colombia, a brief history 
of the country is needed. To be sure, like much of the rest of Latin America, Colombian historical 
trajectory has been defined by continued and sharp socio-economic contrasts and the succession 
of fast-paced developmental initiatives. These include the country’s remarkable insertion into the 
global economy as an important primary commodity exporter starting at the end of the 19th 
century, as well as the limited though regionally significant fast-paced industrialization of the 
middle of the 20th century. 
Though successful in reshaping the socio-economic composition of several key areas of 
the country, these developments have not been instrumental in ameliorating let alone addressing 
the severe inequality that remains as a defining feature of the Colombian society (similar to all the 
other South American countries). To be sure, notwithstanding the remarkable degree of economic 
growth in the middle of the 20th century, this was largely derivative of a cross-sectional alliance 
between traditional landowning families and regional industrialists who worked to consolidate 
control of the decision-making process in traditional oligarchic forces. Although, industrial 
workers did, and still do their best to push the boundaries of the local and national spheres of 
economic and political power (Farnsworth-Avelar 2000; Ioris 2014; Palacio 1983, 2006).  
Similarly, the Colombian experiment with pre-accorded peaceful transitions of power 
among the two main political parties (Liberal and Conservative), called National Front, which 
functioned between 1957 and 1974, provided formal democratic stability at the cost of political 
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exclusion. In fact, through clientelistic party affiliations and restricted legislation, more 
autonomous and popular forms of mobilization were barred from participating in formal politics 
(Hartlyn 1988:183). Finally, at the turn of the century, important segments of Colombian society 
mobilized collectively, calling for a new constitution, which promised a new start for the country 
and was the basis for widespread high expectations. Alongside these legal reforms, negotiations 
between the Colombian government and revolutionary groups have also marked the recent history 
of the country.  
 
Plan Colombia and the Recurrent Militaristic Logic of Peace Building 
 
Starting in the late 1990s, a series of attempts to address the continued problem of a low-
scale yet deeply destructive civil war were pursued. In 1999, President Pastrana (1998-2002) 
agreed to the contentious U.S.-financed and designed Plan Colombia, aimed at curbing drug flow 
(cocaine and heroin in particular) over the Mexican border. Plan Colombia reduced the cultivation 
of cocoa plants, but not cocaine processing (now estimated at around 70% of global production), 
while aggravating the humanitarian crisis. Forced internal displacement from areal fumigation of 
defoliants not only affected coca production areas, but also many peasant-held lands. Continuing 
such a militaristic logic, in 2004, Álvaro Uribe (2002-2010) launched the Patriotic Plan, also with 
the direct involvement of the United States, which aimed to displace guerrilla groups and occupy 
remote areas traditionally controlled by them. New legislation passed the following year promised 
reduced punishments for both paramilitary and guerrilla fighters should they renounce violence 
and return assets appropriated illegally. FARC’s response at that point was an offensive organized 
to counteract military action and undermine the perception that security could improve unilateral 
actions on the part of the central government.  
Consequently, in 2010, the former Secretary of Defense under Uribe,  Juan Manuel Santos, 
the leader who in 2016 secured the peace agreement, was elected president (after the courts decided 
that Uribe could not run for a third term in office). In 2012, Santos announced that the government 
would engage in talks with the FARC in order to explore alternatives to end the long conflict, 
learning from past mistakes and from the frustrated attempts that tried to resolve the issues 
militarily. Thus, in a climate of heightened national and international expectation, Santos 
proclaimed in September 2016 the complete settling of the dispute between the government and 
the FARC and revealed the details of a comprehensive truth and reconciliation process. The 
agreement included the admissions of guilt and the requirement of community service for 
perpetrators of violence. 
 
Assessing the Havana Accord  
 
Although not a legal requirement, President Santos had promised to submit the Peace 
Accord to a public referendum in order to legitimize its targets and the mechanism of retributive 
justice. In fact, given the tumultuous and exclusionary history of the country, it was largely based 
on these idiosyncratic actions of President Santos that a path to a final peace agreement seemed to 
be achievable. Yet, to the surprise of the international community, on October 2, 2016, a divided 
Colombian society rejected (by 50.2%) the first version of the Accord. The negative result 
produced from the ballot boxes did not trigger a reopening of the hostilities, but forced the parties 
involved to go back to the negotiation table. It was not clear what would happen if the ‘No’ 
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prevailed, but both the government and the FARC had already achieved so much, that there was a 
strong willingness to try to secure the anticipated peace.  
Yet to be successful, the Havana Accord needs to be examined in light of the painful history 
of this Andean nation. Endemic violence has been a persistent problem and one important face of 
Colombian society throughout much of its history, not restricted to one sector or geographic region 
(Hartlyn 1988; Lopez-Alves 2000; Sanchez Torres 2007). Moreover, the persistent social 
inequality and wealth concentration of the country require that the top-down modernization and 
industrialization of the country in the middle of the last century be redefined toward a more 
inclusive socio-economic, political, cultural, and environmental frame of reference. The different 
levels of government have to be reorganized so that formerly excluded social segments, not 
restricted to guerrilla groups, are fully included in the formal democratic system, including the 
decision-making process regarding allocation of public services and the demobilization and 
integration of conflict areas. 
Though laudable for trying to move beyond an overly militaristic approach to the structural 
lines of the continued conflict in the country followed by his predecessors, Santos’ actions were 
largely aimed at integrating heretofore economically marginal regions into the global markets. 
Particularly since today’s Colombia’s mainstream policies have become ever more aligned with 
those of free-trade agreements, such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership. This is path that, though 
potentially capable of providing economic growth, is also prone to sustain the sharp social 
cleavages of the Colombian society, should the history of the country be any guide (Richani 2001). 
As potential counterpoints, land reform and the creation of restrictions to foreign involvement in 
key economic activities such a mining and oil exploration were some of the main demands the 
negotiators from the FARC presented repeatedly to the government in order to suspend military 
activities. To be sure, the tentative acceptance of the Santos administration’s land reform 
orchestrated by the FARC has been seen by the insurgents and wider society as one of the most 
promising aspects of the peace process (González Rodríguez 2016). Yet, national and international 
business groups expressed firm interest in the possibilities of oil and mineral exploration (as in the 
case of the Pacific coast and in the Colombian Amazon) offered by the peace accord (information 
from meetings held by the authors at the American and British embassies in Bogota in 2016). 
 
Land Accessibility, the Quintessential Challenge 
 
The issue of land accessibility is central to any effective reforms in a country ravaged by 
land-tenure related historical conflicts. Even when an assertive land reform program was sought, 
such as in the 1960s, little was done to curb countryside violence that, over the last 60 years has 
cost 220,000 deaths, mostly of poor rural residents. In fact, even though land titling was conducted 
in many parts of the country, it was implemented piecemeal and incompletely, blocked in most 
areas by politically powerful large landholders, creating widespread levels of insurgent activity 
(Albertus and Kaplan 2012). Though it was possible for some sectors to thrive during the civil war 
years, particularly those better connected to legal and illegal global markets, the fact remains that 
for the country to fully realize its potential, a more inclusive path of political reconciliation has to 
be promoted. In this sense, the current prospects of the negotiation may signal a potentially 
conclusive settlement, capable of reducing the humanitarian costs involved in this protracted civil 
war, as well as facilitating access to Colombian natural resources. Yet, for a durable and in fact 
transformative peace to be achieved, further challenges remain.  
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In this sense, a final and lasting peace in Colombia requires ample changes in existing 
democratic institutions so that the rule of law can be expanded to the areas of historical conflicts. 
Substantial measures could include some form of mini constituent assembly able to involve and 
thus place responsibility of other political actors in the process. Similarly, the Santos 
administration should seek to make a much better case for the value of any type of transitional 
justice, including the political incorporation of former guerrillas, along with their monitored 
military demobilization. Similarly, effective and peaceful integration of FARC into the political 
arena has to be paved by concrete means to prevent another debacle like the Unión Patriótica 
[Patriotic Union] of the mid-1980s, when more than 3,000 former members of the guerrillas who 
had joined the political process were murdered with total impunity assured by, when not with direct 
involvement of, the state apparatus (Walch 2016).  
 
The Path Forward: Concluding Remarks 
 
The peace accord may create new opportunities for trade with China and access to areas 
that were once inaccessible due to guerrilla activity. However, from the perspective of social 
justice and democratic stability, these actions must be coupled with a firm rejection of the 
continued path of neo-liberal integration of the country into the recent wave of economic trends, 
especially as the hemisphere as whole faces the revived protectionism of the United States, as 
promised by the Trump administration. Though an experience embedded in long, painful national 
history, the construction of a lasting and transformative peace in Colombia has the potential to 
reveal courses of action for much-needed, meaningful political and economic changes in Latin 
America, as well as in many areas of the developing world.  
In the short term, the Santos administration needs to prove capable of preventing the 
derailment of the commitments made by both sides in the Havana Accord, largely by steering the 
process away from the rising right-wing rhetoric of his predecessor. Much in the same way, the 
slowdown in the global demand for Colombia’s exports in recent years poses added challenges to 
consolidating an effective path toward peace. Thus, in order to be effective and lasting, an agenda 
along more inclusive lines of national development needs to be pursued, especially by means of 
effective political and economic incorporation of the most traditionally excluded social segments, 
particularly in the countryside.  
Moreover, the political system needs to prove its willingness to fully incorporate 
demobilized groups and a path of truth and reconciliation should be pursued by all relevant 
members of the Colombian society. As in the case of previous conflicts, a crucial measure will be 
the effective access to land and the ability to maintain agricultural production in new rural 
properties to be established through the peace process. This will be a very challenging experience, 
considering the pressures of an increasingly globalized economy, the rapid urbanization and the 
advance of intense commercial agribusiness in the country. Genuine peace in Colombia is still a 
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